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We observe that  economic restructuring is significantly changing  organizational 
governance. On the one hand, we witness an increase in mergers & acquisitions, which 
substitutes markets for hierarchies and, on the other hand, we see an increase in 
outsourcing and subcontracting activities, appearing to replace hierarchies by markets. 
However, there is evidence that an increasing part of outsourcing activities mix 
hierarchies with market forms of governance. The key argument of this paper is that 
firms have established governance structures based on markets, hierarchies and self-
enforcing relational contracts so that they are able to keep a substantial amount of 
control despite of sourcing out labour. Furthermore, we argue that such hierarchical 
forms of outsourcing produce dependency. U sing empirical evidence of the Austrian 
insurance industry, it i s demonstrated that dependency  is created, firstly, by the 
contractual restriction of alternative uses of resources, secondly, by support measures 
that bind the upstream party closely to the downstream party, thirdly, by relationship-
specific investments made by the upstream party, and fourthly, by authority elements. 
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Introduction 
 
Recent economic and political developments such as the opening of markets 
through increasing economic and political integration, the accession of Central and East 
European countries to the European Union and WTO-agreements have strongly affected 
both public policy and the governing modes of economic exchange in Europe. On the 
one hand, we observe an increase in mergers and acquisitions, which substitutes 
markets for hierarchies, leading to further economic concentration. On the other hand, 
we see an increase in outsourcing and subcontracting activities, which appear to be 
replacing hierarchy by market forms of governance. However, there is empirical 
evidence that an increasing share of outsourcing activities are based on  mixed 
governance structures, integrating hierarchical and market structures (OECD 2000; 
Burchell et al. 1999; Dietrich 1996; Semlinger 1993).  This paper analyses such 
outsourcing activities, gives evidence of  how  firms mix governance structures and 
investigates the consequences for both the upstream (i.e. the outsourced work force) and 
the downstream (i.e. the firm that sources out) parties. 
The motivation for this research lies in the observation that  although  the 
emergence of  “hierarchical” forms of outsourcing (or self-employment) are widely 
discussed in national (e.g. Burchell et al. (1999) and Collins (1990) for the UK; 
Dietrich (1996) for Germany; Lyon-Caen (1990) for France), European (Sciarra 2004; 
Perulli 2003; Eiro 2002; Supiot 2001) and in  international (ILO 2003; OECD 2000) 
political and legal forums, there is a surprising lack of both sociological and economic 
research to understand the emergence and the consequences of this development. 
Hierarchical forms of outsourcing refer to business relationships where the 
upstream party is formally self-employed (or declares itself as self-employed) but the 
conditions of work are similar to those of employees.  Although the upstream party 
works exclusively (or mainly) for a specific firm (downstream party), it is neither 
clearly separated from the firm they contract with nor clearly integrated.  
This development has the effect that both organizational boundaries and the 
boundaries between employment and self-employment becomes blurred, resulting in a 
need to rethink labour and social security law (as most prominently argued in the 
Supiot report). Self-employed persons usually work for a large number of contractors   3
without placing themselves in hierarchical subordination to them. They bear the 
entrepreneurial risk but also gain the entrepreneurial possibilities implied by self-
employment. However, if the self-employed person works only (or  mainly) for one 
contractor in (partial) subordination, part of the entrepreneurial risk is transferred to the 
upstream party, while its entrepreneurial possibilities are restricted. 
Thus, w e argue that these business relationships create  both  economic and 
personal  dependence.  Economic dependence basically means that the  upstream party 
takes (part of) the entrepreneurial risk. Since the upstream party has only one (main) 
contractor  it generates its whole (or a substantial part of  its) income from this  very 
business relationship. Thus, they do not appear on the external market and are thus 
restricted in their alternatives. If we assume that the two parties do not usually agree on 
a constant quantity of orders but quite the contrary, namely that the quantity of business 
transactions depends on the economic situation of the  downstream party, then the 
upstream party obviously takes the entrepreneurial risk.  In the case of the service 
industry with third-party customers, the upstream party is dependent on the downstream 
party due the fact that the upstream party only sells products or services  from the 
downstream party and is dependent on the competitiveness of the downstream party. 
Additionally, in contrast to employees who are (mainly) remunerated with a fixed wage, 
the upstream party in hierarchical forms of outsourcing earns a variable income 
depending on production, which means that it bears demand fluctuations.  Personal 
dependence – or subordination – means that the downstream party strongly determines 
over working methods as well as time, place and content of work. 
However, (partly) transferring entrepreneurial risk is not the only  motive for 
externalising parts of the production or sales process on a hierarchical basis.  These 
contractual arrangements also transform fixed costs into variable ones and allow the 
downstream party to gain financial flexibility. Another pivotal rationale – especially in 
highly regulated labour markets – is to circumvent labour and social security laws. The 
downstream party face less legal constraints of employment protection in terms of 
working time or security since most employment protection laws are not applicable in 
such business relationships.  Moreover, it does not have to pay social security 
contributions and does not bear the financial risk when the worker (the upstream party) 
gets ill.  The upstream party i s, moreover, usually beyond the scope of collective   4
bargaining and trade union representation. Since these business relationships are based 
on commercial contracts rather than employment contracts, there are less regulations 
restricting the contractual arrangement, allowing contracts customised to the special 
needs of the downstream party (Muehlberger 2004). As a result, l egal scientists argue 
that outsourcing activities with hierarchical structures undercut laws that are designed to 
protect workers (Sciarra 2004; Freedland 2003; Perulli 2003; Supiot 2001; Davies and 
Freedland 2000).  
Hierarchical  forms of outsourcing have also an effect on internal labour. It 
decreases the bargaining power of employed labour and circumvents institutionalised 
hierarchical structures (Rubery and Grimshaw 2003). Another rationale is to extend the 
control function of management across  organizational boundaries. By mixing 
governance structures, firms are able to benefit from the advantages of outsourcing 
without losing control over labour and assets. Simultaneously, the downstream party 
increases the incentives for payment and asset maintenance. In other words, by creating 
close (hierarchical) ties, the downstream party improves the trade-off between 
incentives (typically linked t o market transactions) and control (typically linked to 
hierarchy). 
Examples of outsourcing relationships where the upstream party only works for 
one particular firm in the organizational studies literature usually refer to the trucking, 
construction and m edia industries. Analysing the US trucking industry, Baker and 
Hubbard (2004) find that changes in contractibility affect firm boundaries, arguing that 
increased contractibility (for instance, due to better monitoring technology) leads to less 
outsourcing. Arruñada et al. (2004) and Fernández et al. (2000) claim that hierarchical 
forms of outsourcing (or  quasi-integration) is generally more efficient than vertical 
integration  in the European trucking industry  as it solves moral hazard problems, 
simultaneously allowing for economies of scale and density and (partly) solving hold-up 
problems. Looking at the Austrian trucking industry, Muehlberger and Zagler (2003) 
identify the reduction of fixed overheads and changes in the cost structure, volatile 
demand and the partial transferral of economic risk as the main drivers for hierarchical 
outsourcing. 
Empirical research in the construction industry demonstrates that higher risks of 
hold-up reduce the probability of subcontracting because vertical integration is better   5
for solving the quasi-rents expropriation problem ( González-Diáz et al. 2000; Eccles 
1981).  Bosch and Philips (2003) compare the consequences of deregulation in the 
construction industry in nine countries and find that outsourcing is a common response 
to the high financial risk faced in the industry. They argue that subcontracting to 
individual workers “is usually designed to evade regulations protecting wage workers 
rather than designed to extend specialization” (Bosch and Philips 2003: 10). Nisbet 
(1997) finds for the UK construction industry that labour market segmentation (in the 
sense of a primary and secondary labour force) is undermined my the existence of 
discrete advantages generally perceived to exist in both employment and outsourcing 
relationships. 
Empirical studies in the British media industry have highlighted that 
deregulation in public sector services has dramatically changed work organization in 
this sector, strongly stimulating freelance contracts on a self-employed basis (Baumann 
2002; Dex et al. 2000). The result was that the distribution of risk changed dramatically, 
leading to a shift of risk to the outsourced workforce. 
Felstead (1993) analysed franchise contracts in the UK and in Germany, 
stressing that only few franchisees are found be have significant levels of autonomy. He 
finds that franchisees are often dependent workers, being highly vulnerable to changes 
of rules and policy as well as priority and goals of the franchisors. 
Although these empirical papers shed some light on the reasons and 
consequences of outsourcing, they  – with the exemption of Felstead’s analysis of 
franchising  – l ack the analysis of the hierarchical element in these business 
relationships.  However, franchising is a special case in the analysis of hierarchical 
forms of outsourcing because the relationship between the franchisor and the franchisee 
is mostly based on explicit, written contracts that are often standardized as shown in 
Felstead (1993). Hierarchical forms of outsourcing, however, are mainly based  on 
informal, relational contracts. Consequently, this paper aims at adding such a focus to 
the analysis of outsourcing, illuminating the mechanism of organizational governance of 
outsourcing activities that integrate hierarchical and market structures. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section looks at conventional 
theories of organizational governance, arguing that the theoretical distinction between 
hierarchies, markets and networks (or relational markets) does not allow to explain   6
hierarchical forms of outsourcing.  Instead it is hypothesised that such business 
relationships introduce elements of hierarchies into the market by using relational 
contracts that are additionally empowered by dependency (or the lack of alternative uses 
of resources) and hierarchical control elements. On the basis of case study research in 
the Austrian insurance industry, Section 3 tests the hypotheses posed in the previous 
section, illustrating  how firms mix governance structures as well as the creation of 
economic and personal dependency and calculative trust. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
 
Mixing Governance Structures: 
Hierarchies and Relational Contracts in Outsourcing 
 
Research on  organizational governance has been  characterised  by a sharp 
delineation of markets, hierarchies and networks. These different modes of governance 
have long been seen as alternative mechanisms for allocating resources. The Coase-
Williamson transaction cost approach put forward the argument that high costs of 
market transactions (e.g. contracting costs, regulation constraints, marketing costs) can 
make it more efficient to coordinate production within firms (hierarchy) than through 
markets.  In his early research, Williamson (1975) argues that  hierarchies  usually 
function better than markets in completing a related set of transactions because (1) 
bounded rationality problems can be better solved in hierarchies than within markets, 
(2) hierarchies are less vulnerable to the hazards of opportunism due to additional 
incentive and control structures, (3) hierarchies are better in solving information 
problems since the cost of collecting and transferring information is minimised through 
intra-firm information channels and (4) trust is more easily developed within firms than 
between firms. Williamson sees modes of organization as lying on a continuum between 
markets and hierarchies, suggesting that firms might do better than markets because 
they can rely on relational contracts.  Although Williamson’s analysis reflected the 
actual organizational trend of vertical integration during the 1960s and early 1970s, he 
nevertheless  deployed a very narrow definition of the market, not analysing the 
functioning of the market itself. 
In a later publication, Williamson (1985) looks more closely at  market 
transactions, arguing that three dimensions are critical for the decision whether   7
transactions are carried out in-house or by another firm: asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and frequency. The higher the degree of these three dimensions, the higher the 
probability of establishing a non-market governance system (i.e. vertical integration in 
contrast to external business relations). Transactions with a high level of uncertainty 
(i.e.  likelihood of opportunism) and a high degree of asset specificity (i.e.  ex-ante 
investments) require complex contracts and have, moreover, a greater need for ex-post 
adjustments. Finally, high frequency of transactions reduces the fixed costs of a non-
market governance system.  
Although transaction cost economics explores the inefficiencies of markets in 
conducting transactions, it does not look closely at the inefficiencies of the firm in its 
internal  organization and performance.  The crucial point of the transaction cost 
argumentation is the assumption that a firm can reduce the likelihood of opportunism 
through firm-internal administrative fiat. Instead, we argue, firstly, that firms find other 
ways to deal with the problem of opportunism than vertical integration and, secondly, 
that administrative fiat is not necessarily restricted to employees. 
The tendency to vertical disintegration in the late 1970s and 1980s  and the 
combination of vertical integration and disintegration  (through outsourcing activities) 
since the early 1990s has been followed by research on the functioning of the market, 
elaborating  on  business networks and relational contracts between firms. T he aim of 
these newer approaches is to capture the organizational logic of business structures that 
rely on stable, long-term relationships between firms. Networks (e.g. Podolny and Page 
1998; Uzzi 1996; Powell 1990), alliances (e.g. Gulati 1995), joint ventures (e.g. Kogut 
1989), business groups (e.g. Granovetter 1995) or outsourcing (e.g. Helper et al. 2000; 
Dore 1983) are some examples where the market-versus-hierarchy approach fails, and 
new analytical tools like relational contract theory have been developed. In brief, 
research on long-term relationships between firms documents that informal mechanisms 
(e.g. reciprocity) strengthen formal contracts, leading to a variety of advantages like 
spreading risks, facilitating the management of resource dependencies, fostering 
learning, enhancing flexibility, g aining access to specific know-how, realising 
economies of scale and entering new markets. 
This stream of research shows that  long-term business relationships based on 
relational contracts help firms to circumvent difficulties in formal contracting (Baker et   8
al. 2002; Helper et al. 2000; Powell 1990). In this literature, relational contracts refer to 
informal agreements, unwritten codes, and understandings that forcefully affect the 
behaviour of firms when cooperating with other firms. In contrast to formal contracts, 
they leave room for adapting to new information which arises during the business 
relation. The non-specificity of relational contracts, however, means that they are non 
enforceable by a third party ( such as a  court). Consequently, they must be self-
enforcing, implying that “the short-run value of reneging must be less than the long-run 
value of the relationship” (Baker et al. 2002: 41). 
Departing from Macaulay (1963), sociologists and economists have widely 
investigated the logic and consequences of relational contracts. Dore (1983: 459) 
identifies relational contracts in the Japanese textile industry in which “goodwill ‘give-
and-take’ is expected to temper the pursuit of self-interest”, arguing that these supply 
relationships are based on the principle of mutuality and the stability of the relationship. 
Powell (1990) describes relational contracts in networks as being based on “reciprocal, 
preferential, mutually supportive actions”  (p. 271)  and stresses that  Williamson’s 
continuum view of economic exchange is misleading because it “blinds us to the role 
played by reciprocity and collaboration as alternative governance mechanism” (p. 267). 
We argue that the distinction between markets (both spot and relational) and 
hierarchies detracts from the fact that (relational) markets and hierarchies often occur in 
combination with one another. For instance, modern multidivisional firms often deploy 
mixed control mechanisms like profit centres or transfer-pricing. In such cases a price 
control mechanism is mixed with a hierarchical governance structure (Bradach and 
Eccles 1989). A similar mechanism is observable in hierarchical forms of outsourcing. 
We put forward the argument that the organizational structure of firms that use 
hierarchical forms of outsourcing shows two important features. Firstly, these business 
relationships are characterised by  both hierarchy and (relational) markets.  They are 
based on relational contracts that are laced with elements of hierarchy. The authority 
mechanism is primarily enforced by relational contracts since legal regulations  do 
usually not allow to refer to authority in formal contracts. The price mechanism comes 
into play through asset ownership, governance structure competition and performance-
related payment. Asset ownership means that the  upstream party owns the produced 
good or service, which has an implicit price and is, thus, tradable and marketable.   9
Competition through other organizational structures – i.e. hierarchy (employees) and 
spot markets (occasional independent contractors)  – further enhances the price 
mechanism by reducing the bargaining power of the  upstream party.  Another 
component of the price mechanism is that the upstream party  only earns income by 
producing or selling.  
Secondly, many firms that  source out part of their workforce  also have 
employees or spot business relationships which essentially do the same job. Thus, firms 
simultaneously make, buy  and cooperate rather than of the classical make  or buy 
decision. This means that transactions are embedded in the context of other transactions: 
Transactions that are controlled by one mechanism have an impact on transactions 
controlled by another mechanism (Bradach and Eccles 1989). For instance, analysing 
fast-food chains that use both company stores and franchise stores, Lewin-Solomons 
(1998) shows that such systems produce a dynamic efficiency. On the one hand, 
company stores can  use the innovative ideas (such as management or technical 
innovations that lead to more efficient operating procedures) generated by their 
franchisees for the benefit of the company stores. On the other hand, franchisers can use 
the information about production their company stores generate to control the 
franchisees and reduce the uncertainty of opportunistic bargaining. Thus, it may be an 
efficient solution to simultaneously run company and franchise stores even if company 
stores are less efficient than f ranchise stores. Moreover, using various control 
mechanisms simultaneously fosters competition between the two, creating additional 
incentives for both in-house managers and outside contractors. 
Rubery and Grimshaw (2003) offer a similar argument, stressing that the 
simultaneous use of different governance structures displaces risk and consolidates 
power. They emphasise that this corporate strategy is deployed to restructure internal 
organization by using external threat to weaken the internal power of labour and 
circumvent internal constraints. For instance, if the institutionalisation of internal 
structures like labour costs are too difficult to change, externalisation may be employed 
to indirectly alter the system.  
The aim of this paper is to go beyond a  structural analysis of  governance 
structures and to show how firms mix governance structures. It discusses the ways firms 
simultaneously  use (relational) market and hierarchy mechanisms.  Research on   10
hierarchical forms of outsourcing has to focus on both f ormal and, even more 
importantly, on informal organizational structures. Analysing only formal structures and 
relations would not reveal the actual organization of these business relationships since 
hierarchical forms of outsourcing are managed by both formal and informal, relational 
contracts.  
While a formal contract regulates the basic framework of the relationship, often 
forbidding the  upstream party to deal with other parties (exclusiveness), i nformal 
agreements, unwritten codes of conduct and understandings  – in short, relational 
contracts – determine the social structure of the business relationship. We argue that 
hierarchical forms of outsourcing create dependency not only by formal, but also by 
informal means, resulting in the following hypothesis:  Hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing are managed by both formal and relational contracts, creating economic 
and personal dependency (Hypothesis 1). 
 
The essence of managerial control over the upstream party is to make sure that 
the latter works according to the rules and norms of the downstream party and to reduce 
the discrepancy between the upstream’s and the downstream’s goals, or in other words, 
to reduce the principal-agent problem. Research on managerial control in industries with 
third-party customers has emphasized that the triangular relationship between customer, 
employer and worker produces a tension between discretion to workers and hierarchical 
control over workers (Lloyd and Newell 2001; Frenkel et al. 1999). On the one hand, 
discretion and autonomy for workers is seen as important for the quality of the customer 
services since it allows workers to build up a relationship with customers. On the other 
hand,  hierarchical control over workers and less autonomy may ensure better direct 
access to customers to increase customers’ loyalty to the firm rather than to the worker 
and a higher productivity level (Lloyd and Newell 2001). Management literature defines 
hierarchical control as setting goals, monitoring and evaluating  work, providing 
feedback, and  imposing consequences on workers on the basis of their performance. 
Consequently, hierarchical control includes both the provision of information (i.e. goal 
setting, monitoring and feedback) and imposing performance-related consequences (i.e. 
rewards and punishments) (e.g. Anderson and Oliver 1987; Challagalla and Shervani 
1996).   11
As discussed above, hierarchical forms of outsourcing use both the hierarchical 
and the price control mechanism to reduce opportunism. On the one hand, hierarchical 
control is executed using authority structures similar to those in employment 
relationships (i.e. goal setting, monitoring, feedback, rewards and punishments). On the 
other hand,  as described above, the price mechanism through asset ownership, 
competition by  other governance structures and solely performance-related payment 
further enhances control. However, these two control mechanisms are embedded in a 
third mechanism, i.e. the power of relational contracts. As long as relational contracts 
are self-enforcing – meaning that both parties have enough incentives not to renege – 
neither party will compromise the business relationship. Thus, we put forward to the 
following hypothesis: The control mechanism of hierarchical forms of outsourcing is 
based on authority, prices and the self-enforcing nature of relational contracts 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 
Literature on trust in interorganizational relations or networks shows that trust 
helps to overcome problems of opportunistic behaviour and incomplete contracting, 
and, hence, produces an economic value (Nooteboom 2002; Bachmann 2001; Lane and 
Bachmann 1998; Gambetta 1998). While one string of research views trust as based on 
calculation and rationality (e.g. Gibbons 2001; Hardin 1996), the other accentuates that 
trust is value- and norm-based (e.g. Lorenz 1999; Gambetta 1988).
 We do not intend to 
directly take part in this discussion, but rather concentrate on its relevance for the 
subject-matter of this paper. Referring to proponents of the value- and norm-based trust 
view such as Gambetta (1988) or Zucker (1986), Lane (1998: 6) states that “trust begins 
where rational prediction ends”. Some authors in this debate argue that trust based on 
calculation is not really trust at all. Although we agree that calculative trust is indeed a 
different kind of trust, we nevertheless use the same word (“trust”) because we argue 
that the outcome is the same although the reason or cognitive basis differs. Expressed 
differently, in calculative trust, parties behave “as if” they trusted the other party.  
Rubery and Grimshaw (2003)  and Nooteboom (2002) argue  that existing 
theories of interorganizational contracting assume that organizations are treated as if 
they have the same status within networks. They suggest that power drives out trust   12
between unequal partners or, in other words, that trust and power are mutually exclusive 
in unequal business relationships. 
So far we have argued that hierarchical forms of outsourcing refer to business 
relationships where the downstream party is extremely powerful in comparison to the 
upstream party. Does this mean that if the downstream party is too powerful to be 
trusted, it has no incentive not to renege on its commitments? Is the downstream party 
capable of making credible commitments to the upstream party and thus, of building up 
trust?  
In accordance with Farrell (2004) and Bachmann (2001), we claim that it is 
important to consider forms of trust between unequal parties since the majority of 
interorganizational relations are based on both power and trust. Thus, we hypothesise 
that trust is also generated in business relationships with strong asymmetries of trust, as 
observed in hierarchical forms of outsourcing: Despite dependency and asymmetries of 
power, hierarchical forms of outsourcing produce calculative trust (Hypothesis 3). 
 
Hierarchical Forms of Outsourcing in the Austrian Insurance Industry 
 
The following case study research in the Austrian insurance industry aims at 
testing the hypotheses described above, analysing how firms mix governance structures 
and discussing the consequences for both the upstream and the downstream party. The 
insurance industry makes an excellent case study because most insurance companies 
organize their distribution using different channels like direct sales agents, tied agents 
and independent agents. Although these different workers perform the same kind of 
work, namely selling insurance contracts to clients, they work on a different contractual 
basis. In contrast to tied and independent agents, direct sales agents are employees of 
the insurance companies. Both tied and independent agents are self-employed but have 
different contracts with insurance companies. Whilst a tied agent is only allowed to 
represent one particular insurance company, an independent agent is able to sell 
insurance contracts from different companies. Although tied agents are self-employed 
and work from their own premises, they nevertheless access the market under the logo 
and name of the insurance company they contract with.   13
The Austrian insurance industry has seen an intensive restructuring process - 
mainly a result of deregulation and increased competition following the accession to the 
European Union in 1995  - significantly altering the organisation of work.  Austrian 
insurance companies have downscaled their employed sales force by sourcing out on a 
hierarchical basis. All major insurance companies in Austria – and all eight insurance 
companies covered by this case study – have started to work with tied agents since the 
mid-1990s. 
While the direct sales force of an insurance company does not bear the 
entrepreneurial risk, the tied agents  (partly) do for various reasons. First, whilst the 
direct sales force earns a basic salary plus commission for every insurance policy they 
sell, the tied agent receives only commission. Thus, in case of low demand of insurance 
products or a reduction in the competitiveness of the specific insurance company, 
employees are guaranteed a fixed income, while tied agents loose (part) of their income. 
Second, in contrast to the direct sales force, tied agents must finance their own assets 
(i.e. office, car, IT). Third, tied agents face economic risk when they are prevented from 
carrying out their work (e.g. illness, holidays). Finally, they invest in specific human 
capital since they sell insurance products from only one firm. For this and for other 
reasons (e.g. contractual clause), switching contract partner creates costs. 
The following analysis is based on 32 semi-structured interviews in the Austrian 
insurance industry. It includes eight major insurance companies, representing a market 
share 64.7 per cent (using total gross premiums of 2001). We interviewed not only high-
level  managers from insurance companies, but also salespeople representing different 
forms of work relationships (i.e. employment, self-employment and hierarchical forms 
of outsourcing/self-employment): employees of the companies’ direct sales force, tied 
agents, and independent financial advisers. In addition, officials from trade unions and 
professional associations were interviewed to discuss hierarchical forms of outsourcing 
and working relationships in the insurance industry. 
 
Mixing Governance Structures and the Creation of Dependency (Hypothesis 1) 
Above we have argued that hierarchical forms of outsourcing are based on both formal 
and relational contracts.  The analysis of hierarchical forms of outsourcing in the 
Austrian insurance industry shows that formal contracts only regulate the basic   14
framework of the relationship, while the details are managed by relational contracts. 
Formal contracts determine the exclusiveness of the business relationship (i.e. that tied 
agents are only allowed to sell insurance products of their contract partner), the amount 
of the commission for products sold and, in some reported cases, also the details of the 
financial support, a minimum turnover or the treatment of the files of the customers (i.e. 
the client bank) after the termination of the contract. On the other side, formal contracts 
do not regulate issues such as the organization of administration, training, provision of 
business know-how and management skills, assistance in (or control of) accounting, IT, 
tax matters, organization of business meetings with company managers or pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary incentive schemes. 
The rationales behind the simultaneous use of formal and relational contracts are 
the following. First, in order to avoid conflicts with legal regulations, insurance 
companies have to ensure not to include any authority or routine mechanisms in legal 
contracts that raise suspicion of an employment relation. Thus, insurance companies 
have a strong interest in using a formal contract for the basic set-up of the business 
relationship and a relational contract that allows them to have a certain amount of 
managerial  control over their tied agents. Second, writing a complete contract would 
require to foresee and describe all the relevant contingencies. Moreover, the parties 
must be able to determine the actions to be taken for each possible contingency. Since it 
is not possible to write such contracts (and if possible, they would be too costly) due to 
bounded rationality problems, the parties have to restrict the formal contract to clearly 
definable issues as described above. Most issues of the actual  organization of the 
business relationship are therefore governed by relational contracts. 
We argue that the normative basis of hierarchical forms of outsourcing is the 
upstream’s dependency upon the downstream party, expressed by formal and informal 
means. A tied agent’s dependence on an insurance company is created by two different 
mechanisms. First, insurance companies grant their tied agents a wide range of support 
in order to solve the principal-agent problem.  Insurance companies offer their tied 
agents low-interest loans to build up their business. However, if the tied agents cancel 
the contract, the interest rate of the loans sharply increase. In addition, insurance 
companies financially support the purchase of office and IT equipment or marketing 
material. The reason for this financial support measures is not only to tie the agent   15
closer to the insurance company, but also to ensure that  it represents the insurance 
accordingly (i.e. to solve the principle-agent problem). Other support measures are the 
provision of business know-how and management skills. For instance, some insurance 
companies develop a business plan for their tied agents, while others offer their tied 
agents entrepreneurial knowledge for the preparation of a business plan. Furthermore, 
insurance companies offer  support with accounting, IT, tax consultancy, business 
management. However, these supporting measures are also designed to bind the agent 
more tightly to the insurance company, imposing high costs for changing contract 
partner. 
Second, insurance companies have  developed various managerial control 
instruments, introducing elements of hierarchy into the business relationship which 
makes the actual work organization of tied agents similar to that of the employed direct 
sales force. For example, tied agents have regular meetings with company managers and 
supervisors, ensuring the insurance company to be constantly informed about business 
development and other issues. Furthermore, insurance companies control whether their 
tied agents comply with the insurance company’s corporate culture in terms of 
marketing, advertising or corporate design. Some managers of insurance companies 
even reported that they mandates trustees to audit their tied agents and undertake 
customer surveys to check the quality of the interaction with customers. It is shown that 
the development of information technology plays a crucial role here since it strongly 
decreases controlling costs. 
On the basis of the definition of dependency in the introductory section of this 
paper, we have empirically observed both forms of dependency, i.e. economic and 
personal dependency. Economic dependence is mainly created by the exclusiveness of 
the business relationship and financial support measures that tie the agent closely to the 
principal by increasing the costs of outsider options. Personal dependence is created by 
support measures that increase the managerial control over the agent, such as assistance 
for accounting, IT, tax issues, or business know-how. 
 
The Control Mechanism (Hypothesis 2) 
The case study has revealed that insurance companies not only use elements of markets 
and hierarchies, but also relational contracts to control their tied agents. First, control   16
through the price mechanism is exercised by asset ownership,  distribution channel 
competition and a performance-related payment structure. The most important asset in 
the business relationships described in this paper is the client bank (i.e. the files of the 
customers). Theoretically, the client bank is owned by the insurance companies. 
However, it  is the insurance agent who has direct access to customers and thus an 
influence on the decisions of customers. Consequently,  managers from insurance 
companies stress that the tied agents de facto own the produced asset ‘client bank’. This 
creates an implicit price for which the downstream party would have to buy the client 
bank after the termination of the business relationship. This price mechanism helps to 
motivate the tied agents to undertake activities that increase the value of their de-facto-
asset, enhancing efficiency and mitigating the principal-agent problem. Competition by 
other  distribution channels  – i.e. the direct sales force and independent financial 
advisers – strengthens the price mechanism by reducing the bargaining power of tied 
agents. On the one hand, insurance managers stress that the motive for sourcing out 
labour is not only to dispose the “problem of labour law”, but also to reduce overhead 
costs by transforming fixed costs into variable costs. On the other hand, employees 
(direct sales force) report managerial threats to further source out labour. Consequently, 
insurance companies use the multi-channel distribution strategy to bring competition 
into the firm and, thus, to reduce the room for manoeuvre for each distribution channel. 
A final layer of the price control mechanism is that tied agents only earn when they sell 
since they have – in contrast to the employed direct sales force – no guaranteed income. 
Second, as already argued above, the downstream party deploys authority 
(hierarchy) mainly by  informal agreements in order not to get in conflict with legal 
regulations. Case study research has revealed that insurance companies have developed 
sophisticated mechanisms of controlling the work of tied agents. The main source of 
managerial  control are regular meetings with company managers and supervisors as 
well as bureaucratic checks by compliance supervisors. Moreover, interviewees have 
reported that control is executed through trustees (such as chartered accountants), 
customer surveys, training obligations or internal regulations of market appearance. 
More subtler layers of control are specific pecuniary (e.g. commission structure) and 
non-pecuniary (e.g. contests) incentive schemes. Insurance mangers further stress that 
monitoring increases when tied agents under-perform, resulting in the cancellation of   17
the contract if sales do not increase eventually.  In sum, we found that insurance 
companies use all dimensions of hierarchical control  – i.e. goal setting, monitoring, 
feedback, rewards and punishments.  The authority mechanism is, additionally, 
facilitated by the fact that most insurance companies deploy individuals of their former 
direct sales force and can thus apply firm-specific routines. 
Third, the relationships between insurance companies and their tied agents are 
controlled by relational contracts. Relational contracts have two major aims in these 
business relationships. On the one hand, they help to circumvent difficulties in formal 
contracting and to be compliant with legal rules as already discussed above. On the 
other hand, they provide incentives for both parties not to behave opportunistically due 
to the self-enforcing nature of relational contracts. Interviews have proven that the 
business relationship between insurance companies and their tied agents is organized in 
a way so that both parties profit in the longer term. For instance, tied agents get better 
conditions, higher commissions and have less hierarchical control the longer (and 
better) the business relationship goes. If tied agents sell long-term insurance products 
(e.g. private pension), they get a part of their commission after the insurance contract is 
signed and subsequent payments every year as long as the insurance contract continues. 
However, after termination  of the business contract, the  tied agent either looses the 
subsequent payments entirely or only receives a small part of them. Thus, tied agents 
would loose part of their income if they cancelled the contracts. Further, the conditions 
of the financial support improve over time, reducing the dependency due to credits. Of 
course, also insurance companies profit from a longer term perspective of the business 
relationship since the discounted (or present) value of training and recruiting costs as 
well as costs of supporting tied agents decrease over time. 
In sum, an important characteristic of  hierarchical forms of outsourcing is the 
interplay of different layers of control. The long-term incentive structure of  self-
enforcing relational contracts is fortified by hierarchies and the market mechanisms. 
 
Dependency, Asymmetries of Power and Calculative Trust (Hypothesis 3) 
Although, the climate between the upstream and the downstream parties is bureaucratic 
(due to the hierarchical governance mechanism), it is also  characterised by mutual 
benefits produced by self-enforcing relational contracts. Bureaucracy and administrative   18
fiat plays a crucial role in  these business relationship.  As argued above,  insurance 
companies have developed a large range of managerial control over their tied agents 
similar to employment relationships. This is additionally strengthened by the fact that 
many insurance companies supervise their tied agents through the same managers that 
control the direct sales force. Moreover, most tied agents were previously employed by 
the same insurance company, also reinforcing the bureaucratic climate. 
Nevertheless, this study also shows that the nature of self-enforcing relational 
contracts creates mutual benefits in the long run and thus trust. On the one side, tied 
agents have an incentive to behave trustworthy because they are interested in a long-
term relationship due to the high costs of alternative options in the short run. The 
insurance company, on the other side, trusts the tied agent because it takes the rationales 
of the tied agent into account. Thus, we found that the institutional framework of these 
business relationships produces incentives for both parties to behave trustworthy despite 
the asymmetries of power. The resulting trust is defined as calculative, rational trust, 
where parties behave “as if” they trusted the other party due to the institutional 
framework of the business relationship. 
The amount of commitment the business parties generate is strongly determined 
by the underlying self-enforcing relational contracts and the resulting creation of 
calculative trust. The downstream party is interested in getting high-value work from 
the upstream party. Since it is difficult to write a contract which determines high-value 
work (despite the fact that it may be observable), the parties agree upon relational 
contracts that provide – as discussed above – the necessary incentives to carry out work 
with an observable but non-contractible high value due to the long-term value of the 
relationship. Hence, long-term relational contracts provide i ncentives to show a high 
level of commitment in order to profit from future payoffs. Additionally, the 
hierarchical control mechanism forces the upstream party to show a substantial amount 




The re-emergence of outsourcing and the creation of hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing has resulted in an active legal and political debate on possible reforms on   19
the national and EU level. This paper has highlighted that the binary distinction between 
subordinate employment and self-employment no longer reflects the work organization 
of the postfordist firm. Not only has the technical and operational independence of 
employees risen (“work empowerment”), but also self-employed individuals working 
closely with a main principal are observed to show characteristics of dependence 
(Sciarra 2004; Perulli 2003; Supiot 2001; OECD 2000; Burchell el al. 1999). 
Sciarra (2004) and Perulli (2003) point out that is most difficult to assess 
dependent forms of self-employment due to its complexity and ambiguity. On the one 
hand, we observe different levels of dependency and autonomy, and on the other, very 
heterogeneous circumstances of industries and professions. The aim of this paper was to 
empirically demonstrate how dependency is created in hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing, focussing on the different layers of control. Although  research in the 
British insurance industry, the Austrian trucking and business service industry 
(Muehlberger  and Zagler  2003; Muehlberger 2004) and in the British and German 
franchising industry (Felstead 1993) has shown that industrial and national regulations 
play a crucial role in the emergence of hierarchical forms of outsourcing, the 
organizational logic of hierarchical forms of outsourcing  – i.e. the introduction of 
hierarchical elements into the market by relational contracts that are additionally 
empowered by dependency – proves to be very similar over industries and countries. 
We find that  the  work relationships resulting of hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing are close to that of employment. First, the downstream party strongly 
controls the work of the upstream party. The downstream party not only sets the goals 
of the upstream’s performance (e.g. through development of the business plan), but also 
closely monitors the upstream party by both information technology  and regular 
meetings with supervisors.  Like with employees, the downstream party cancels the 
contract if the upstream party under-performs for a certain period of time. We have seen 
that the control mechanism works not only through hierarchy, but also through prices 
(asset ownership, governance structure competition, performance-related payment). 
The discretion-control-dilemma is  (partly)  solved by  both the de facto 
transference  of  asset ownership to the upstream party and the performance-related 
payment. This way, the upstream party has a strong incentive to find a profitable 
balance between customer service quality and productivity. Nevertheless,  managers   20
have also emphasized that access to  customers  is more difficult in comparison to 
employing agents. However, the downstream party tries to mitigate this effect by 
offering the upstream party to buy the client bank after termination of the contract. 
Second, the upstream party is substantially integrated into the business of the 
downstream party. Although the upstream party works from its own premises, it 
nevertheless works under the logo and the name of the downstream party, making it 
difficult for customers to realize that they deal with a self-employed agent. We have 
seen that the upstream party successfully introduces hierarchical elements into the 
business relationship, placing the upstream party in partial subordination. 
However, unlike  employees,  the upstream party  in hierarchical forms of 
outsourcing bears part of the entrepreneurial risk. While employees have a fixed basic 
income, self-employed agents only earn when they produce or sell. Thus, demand 
fluctuations, the competitiveness of the downstream party and events that prevent the 
upstream party from working (e.g. illness) are risks the upstream party has to take. 
Nevertheless, we have also seen that although various support measures (e.g. business 
know-how, accounting, IT) aim at binding the upstream party closely to the downstream 
party, they also help to counterbalance the effects of the risk transfer. 
In sum, we argue that firms use hierarchical forms of outsourcing to reduce the 
flexibility-control dilemma. On the one hand, sourcing out labour displaces part of the 
entrepreneurial risk and detaches the downstream party from employment and social 
security law, allowing to gain financial and organisational flexibility. On the other hand, 
the downstream party nevertheless keeps a substantial part of control over labour.   21
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